A review of recent work on embodied cognition in the cognitive sciences that locates that work historically and treats the philosophical issues it raises.
Mental Causation and Explanation I
As the publication dates on the twenty works in this section and the next indicate, the 1990s saw a lot of concentrated thinking about the implications of individualism and externalism for mental causation and psychological explanation. Burge 1989 is a fairly direct response to Fodor's influential chapter 2 of Psychosemantics, while Burge 1993 more generally suggests a primacy for explanatory practice over appeals to abstract metaphysical claims about science as a guide in thinking about mental causation. Antony 1993 and Crane 1991 both provide some individualistic pushback by returning to offer reinterpretations of the original PutnamBurge thought experiments. Egan 1991 and Egan 1999 both focus on computational explanation, aiming to show that the kinds of computationalism explicit in leading theories in the cognitive sciences, such as Marr's Theory of Vision, are either individualistic or compatible with individualism. Baker 1995 shares Burge's emphasis on explanation, being in many ways more closely allied to common sense and pragmatism about folk psychology than is much of the language of thoughtinspired literature, while Braun 1991 is more skeptical about such explanatorybased arguments. Finally, the essays in Heil and Mele 1993 on mental causation and the review of work on supervenience offered in Horgan 1993 will provide graduate students with a good sense of the lay of the land on these more general topics and their relevance to the debate over internalism and externalism. Defends the view that while the usual, explanatorybased arguments for doing cognitive science without a (wide) notion of content are flawed, we just cannot tell (now) whether cognitive science needs a notion of content. Argues, on the heels of a passing suggestion in his "Individualism and the Mental" (Burge 1979, cited under Classic and Early Work) , that token identity theories provide no help in understanding mental causation; our explanatory practices rather than philosophical metaphysics should guide us here. Attempts to show that a proper understanding of computational explanation is consistent with narrow taxonomies, and that these latter are to be preferred. An excellent review article on supervenience and the philosophy of mind whose suggestions for "where the action will be" can now be checked, twentyfive years later; gets extra points for using "superdupervenience" in the title.
Mental Causation and Explanation II
The apparent conflict between internalism and folk psychology's reliance on broad or wide content had both compatibilist and incompatibilist responses. Kitcher 1985 is a compatibilist response, defending the individualistic nature of computational psychology but according a place for ordinary, wide content in psychological explanation. Jackson and Pettit 1988 likewise proposes a way to understand the utility of broad Argues for a middle ground position that defends computational psychology as individualistic but allows (wide) content to play a role in psychological explanation.
Intentionality: Books
As one might expect, given the importance of intentionality to the debate over internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind, a number of the books mentioned in General Background and Classic and Early Work that either advocate (e.g., Stich 1996, cited under 
Phenomenal Intentionality
The debate over internalism and externalism has been so central to the philosophy of mind since the 1970s, as we have seen, in part because of what it implies about intentionality, representation, or mental content. The leading accounts of intentionality in the last quarter of the 20th century were causal/informational theories epistemized by Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981), and teleological or biosemantic theories whose most systematic development can be found in Ruth Millikan's Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984) Proposes that visual consciousness is an action and develops this idea in externalistfriendly ways; many affinities to Dennett's views of consciousness. Closely examines Searle's connection argument for the claim that only potentially conscious states have intentional content and argues for a position intermediate between two extremes, one represented by Searle, the other by Dennett's view that intentionality can be understood independent of consciousness. On van Gulick's view, nonphenomenal intentionality is the primary base for at least partially explaining phenomenal consciousness.
Consciousness, Phenomenology, and Experience: Books
As the previous few sections indicate, although the debate between internalists and externalists focused originally on intentionality and the nature of mental representation, with the resurgence of general interest in consciousness in the 1990s, the implications for views of consciousness of the shift to an externalist view began to be explored as that decade wore on. Dennett 1991 and Chalmers 1996 are two of the most influential general books on consciousness from that period. Neither contains any explicit discussion of internalism and externalism, although in general terms Chalmers has subsequently developed views more sympathetic to internalism, and Dennett's views are more sympathetic to externalism. Lycan 1996 and Dretske 1996 each develop perspectives on consciousness and experience that extend the previous work of the authors within a broadly externalist framework: Lycan remains focused on the functionalism he had defended in his Consciousness (1987), while Dretske draws together and expands on his earlier work on perception and the naturalizing project that he pursued in developing information semantics. Siewert 1998 and Hurley 1998 are influential books published in the same year that contrast in interesting ways. Siewert 1998 is a more traditional philosophical analysis of consciousness that concentrates on the first person perspective and puzzles that arise for it about consciousness, privileged access, and cognitive neglect. Hurley 1998, by contrast, offers a rethinking of the relationship between vision and action that challenges both general internalist views of consciousness and specific arguments that appeal to thought experiments that buttress internalist intuitions. Orlandi 2014 shares with Hurley an attempt to rethink visual processing in a broadly externalist framework. All three draw on the empirical literature in informative ways, and even twenty years later, are worth a read. Farkas 2008 develops the notsocompromising form of internalism the author touts in Farkas 2008 (cited under Phenomenal Intentionality), while Siegel 2010 continues more traditional work in the philosophy of perception that largely bypasses the internalismexternalism debate, though short sections in several of the chapters take up that debate. The essays in Bayne and Montague 2011, as well as the editorial introduction to the volume, provide a good sense of why cognitive phenomenology has been at the center of much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind, and in the relationships between that discussion in the debate over internalism and externalism. Based on his doctoral dissertation, a book that garnered immediate and widespread attention from the time it was published from both philosophers and nonphilosophers.
Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown, 1991.
A sort of extension of Dennett's intentional stance to consciousness, developed with a more explicitly eliminativist twist; a book that many psychologists and cognitive scientists viewed as the most relevant book by a philosopher on consciousness published in the 1980s and 1990s. Presents a sustained internalist view of mentality that appeals to the perspectival nature of distinctively mental states and pushes back against the trend toward externalism in much of the literature of the 1990s, in part by drawing more explicitly on issues in the philosophy of language.
Hurley, Susan. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
A tour de force consisting of relatively independent chapters that challenge a number of dominant views of consciousness and thought experiments (e.g., Block's "Inverted Earth") commonly used in the consciousness literature. 
Marr's Theory of Vision
Early reactions to Putnam 1975 and Burge 1979 (both cited under Classic and Early Work) included something like the following line of thought: OK, so our folk psychological conception of content is infected with externalism, but short of going the whole eliminativist hog about mental representation-stitching oneself into church land-none of this intuitionmongering about Twin Earth or "tharthritis" of "chofas" has much relevance for cognitive science. At best ambivalently entertained by its proponents, such thinking was scurried in Burge 1986 (cited under Classic and Early Work), which argued explicitly that Marr's theory of vision, a sort of paradigm of work in computational vision highly regarded within the cognitive sciences, trafficked in wide content. both of which build on earlier and somewhat messier papers that the authors had published on the same topic. Egan 1992 (cited under Narrow Content II) had argued that computatonal theories of vision were individualistic and offered a sort of "no content" view of Marr's theory; Egan 1995 usefully locates this view in a broader philosophy of science framework. Shapiro 1997 rejects this no content view and defends an externalist view of content within Marr's theory; it goes beyond Shapiro 1993 in informative ways by sketching a bigger picture view located between the philosophy of mind and science. Butler 1996, in turn, critiques Shapiro 1993, while Butler 1998 focused more directly on Egan's views; both attempt to buttress individualistic understandings of Marr's theory of vision. Kitcher 1988, Davies 1991, and  
